‘Vengeance is Mine.’  Heroes from the Movie-Powerhouse of Emotions. by Früchtl, Josef
‘Vengeance is Mine.’
Heroes from the Movie-Powerhouse of
Emotions.
Author
Josef Früchtl
Affiliation
University of Amsterdam
Abstract: In this text, I am guided by an interest in cinema as a well-understood
emotion machine which creates a common sense. From this perspective, I approach
the subject matter of heroism, using the emotions linked to vengeance as a con-
nection between heroism and the cinematic production of common sense. In so
doing, I put forward several theses for discussion: that film—like art in general—is
a medium which founds community; that such a founding of community essentially
occurs via the dimensions of emotion, in our case the dimension of a specific aes-
thetic emotion; that the hero is a figure emerging from the founding of community;
and, finally, that feelings of vengeance—like figures of heroism—are made present
in cinema in an exemplary manner.
One of the problems characteristic for my generation “Born in the 50s” (The
Police) focuses on the concept of “culture industry”. As is generally known,
Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno coined this concept at the begin-
ning of the 1940s in their US-American exile, faced with a culture not geared
to the paradigm of the autonomous work of art, but to industrial standards of
mass production. Popular music, radio, television and, above all, film ‘made
in Hollywood’ stand for this culture, which therefore appears as unculture.
People like us did not have to learn this by making an effort to appropriate
texts from Critical Theory, but it was evident—particularly being a young
critical contemporary—through one’s own experience. Those born into the
Schlager, the German “hit song” or music purely for entertainment, and the
Heimatfilm, did not have to go to the Frankfurt School in order to realize
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that something was not right with these films and songs. And they realized
it because there was another kind of popular music and film. Above all,
there were western movies, showing a landscape and a type of character—
predominantly male, of course—who announced a completely different, wilder
form of life than the ranger in the silver forest.1 It turned out to be somehow
prohibited to approve of the cultural products as a critic, and later a ‘critical
critic’, which you did, in fact, approve of, as a contemporary. You thus had
to struggle with a schizophrenic split of sorts. When you wanted to ennoble
yourself intellectually—which, as philosophy students we wanted, of course,
to do—you saw yourself as a figure of what Hegel called “unhappy conscious-
ness”, a consciousness which both, incorporates a contradiction, and is aware
of the fact.2
Against this background, my interest in, no, my love of film is crossed by
ambivalences, and a large part of my theoretical work—but not only mine—
tends to justify these ambivalences. Critical Theory in the sense of the Frank-
furt School, and thus Hegel as well, still offers a very helpful framework for
this, particularly since Critical Theory always accentuates its historical char-
acter as well, which includes the point that a theory which is critical of society
has to react to subjective and collective experiences. Bearing this in mind,
my book on the Heroic History of Modernity is the extended answer to the
hypothetical question of how it would be to go to the cinema with Hegel.3 In
the heroic figures of the movies—above all westerns, crime and science fiction
movies—we encounter variants of the heroic figure of modernity: the self or
subjectivity.
In this text I am guided, though, by another interest, namely an interest
in cinema as a well-understood machine of emotions which creates a common
sense, a sense for what is culturally common to us. From this perspective,
I once again approach the subject of heroism, using the emotions connected
with vengeance as a connection between the two. In so doing, I put forward
in a more general way several theses for discussion: firstly, that film—like
art in general—is a medium which founds community; secondly, that such a
founding of community essentially occurs via dimensions of emotion, in our
case a specific aesthetic emotion; thirdly, that the hero—as a figure of our
mythological and aesthetic-dramatic narrative—is a figure emerging from the
founding of community; and, finally, that feelings of vengeance—like figures
of heroism—are made present in cinema in a representative way.
I
“It starts with a love story and ends with divorce. It starts in the year 1933
and ends in ruins. The great operas open promisingly with elevated senti-
ment, and by the fifth act we are counting the dead.”4 The soft voice-over of
Alexander Kluge narrates this quotation in his movie The Power of Emotions
(Macht der Gefühle). “All emotions”, the voice tells us, “believe in a happy
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ending”.5 And yet, the little and big, private and historical catastrophes take
their course—at the opera, on screen, in real life. Kluge also emphasizes the
similarities between cinema and opera. Like Werner Schroeter—the director
of films, operas, and theatre who died a few years ago—he speaks of opera
as a “powerhouse of emotions”( Kraftwerk der Gefühle. See the conversation
with Werner Schroeter in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, May 19, 2010.)
Opera works like a generating station, creating endless amounts of emotional
energy, so to speak. One can claim the same for cinema. As has often been
remarked, in the 20th century, cinema has assumed the legacy of opera. The
Power of Emotions, in any case, is a movie where opera plays a starring role.
What does “all emotions believe in a happy ending” actually mean? What,
specifically, does it mean in the case of an aggressive emotion linked to
vengeance? The German word “Ausgang” means “ending”, “result” or “so-
lution”. So this phrase implies that the vengeance has come to be, and that
its fulfilment accomplishes a feeling of satisfaction—a satisfaction of one’s
own agitated existence. A realized vengeance thus has the effect of a realized
desire: the production of something which is desirable in the sense of eudai-
monia or the self-reliant idea of the good life. Emotions, then, and perhaps
all emotions, believe in a happy occurrence in which one is involved because
it is eudaimonic; because it illustrates what is deemed to be a life worth
living. Unlike merely physical sensations, like pain or erotic lust, emotions
have a cognitive content, to use an expression from the analytical tradition
of philosophy. They point to something, to things or persons, which then ac-
quire an emotional value. These things or persons then appear, for example,
worth loving or hating, attractive or repulsive, interesting or boring. Emo-
tions state, indicate—like a warning lamp—and betray, divulge, give away,
how one is feeling. When we want something not as a means to an end, but
for its own sake, its value is shown solely in emotions or affects.6
II
In the words of Kluge and Schröter, film can be called a powerhouse of emo-
tions as a successor or technological update of opera. And to the extent
that all emotions, even aggressive ones, believe in a happy ending, film is a
powerhouse which produces energetic performances of the good life. Since
these performances are, in addition, shared more or less collectively—for the
very reason that otherwise they would not be presented in a film, a cultural
product which always has to be collectively successful as well, making a profit
within the market economy—film is a medium potentially able to found com-
munity. Naturally this assertion requires further explanation with regard to
both the history of ideas and aesthetics.
The idea that the field of the aesthetic possesses an essential function
for political and moral community initially came from the Scottish and Ger-
man Enlightenment, represented by David Hume, Edmund Burke and Adam
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Smith, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing and Immanuel Kant. Expressed in their
terms, this is the field of taste, judgement, sensus communis and bourgeois-
moral upbringing. Balthasar Gracian may have given the initial impetus to
a history of ‘good taste’ in a ‘good society’ in the first half of the 17th cen-
tury, but it was to be another one hundred years before philosophy was ready
to take this concept seriously, particularly in its politico-moral significance.
The discourse of the late 18th century took place, namely, against the darkly
coloured background of a conviction that growing affluence and increasing
individualism threaten the integrity of a community—its righteousness and
intactness.7 And it is already a basic conviction shared by the founding figures
of modern political philosophy, Thomas Hobbes and Spinoza, that a social
bond cannot evolve from reason, or at least not from reason alone, whether
that be moral reason oriented to the common good or economic reason ori-
ented to self-interest. A social bond requires emotions, passions and affects
to, at least, an equal degree.8
The 18th century, which is also commonly known as the century of En-
lightenment, was not singularly interested in reason “per se”. It was also the
age of “sensibility” and a new theory of emotions partly inspired by the suc-
cess of the natural sciences and their sensual-empirical procedures. It was the
novel—Samuel Richardson’s Pamela, or Virtue Rewarded (1740) and Jean-
Jacques Rousseau’s Julie ou la nouvelle Héloise (1761)—and in particular
theatre, that permitted their respective audiences of readers and spectators
to feel sympathy with the characters portrayed, and in so doing to enjoy their
own ability to feel. In those days, it was not embarrassing to weep in public,
but rather a sign of moral sensibility. And this aesthetic-cultural characteris-
tic has surely been preserved. What connects the theatre of the 18th century
with the opera of the 19th century and the Hollywood movies of the 20th
century is primarily the peculiarity, that these art forms share, of not making
a categorical distinction between so-called higher values and the expression
of feelings, between morality and emotionality.9 A much-quoted phrase by
Douglas Sirk has become a downright formula for film: “motion is emotion”.
The moving images of film—of the motion picture—are both presentations
of moving actions, and inwardly moving (touching, stirring). And although
Sirk’s phrase is especially accurate for certain film genres—for example the
genre of the melodrama, in which he was a master, but also that of the hor-
ror film—it is also possible to describe film in general, very positively, as an
emotion machine.10
It is important to point out that an aesthetic emotion is a specific emotion.
This, I am convinced, can best be understood, via the tradition of Kant and
John Dewey, as the effect of an interplay between different dimensions of expe-
rience and rationality, namely the cognitive, moral-ethical (including political
and religious) and sensual dimensions, and imagination. And as the effect of
an interplay, aesthetic emotion is not dominated by a particular principle,
for example that of formulating a truth-apt theory or a moral obligation,
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or of increasing physical enjoyment, or of adhering strictly to means-ends
relationships. Far more, it keeps these principles playfully in the air, in a
state of tension. By following this principle (which is not a principle), it is
the intrinsic dimension of experience itself, the very process of experiencing,
which forms the core of aesthetic emotion. To this extent, aesthetic emotion
is never merely a feeling, but—literally—the having (undergoing, producing)
of an experience.11
An aesthetic emotion is the expression of an aesthetic experience. When
the phenomenon underlying such an emotion is a work of art, in an act of
self-reflection that work’s theme may happen to be itself a process of gener-
ating aesthetic emotions. Accidental Hero (1992) is a good example of this.
The film is about a loser who never stops complaining, but accidentally be-
comes a hero when, reluctantly, he rescues people from a crashed aeroplane.
More precisely, he becomes a hero by being made into a hero. In our age, the
authority capable of achieving this effect is the mass media. The film’s direc-
tor, Stephen Frears, was attracted by the theme of amalgamating authentic
yearning—for a noble story—and cynical marketing. He consolidates this
theme in a scene where an ambitious top reporter, played by Geena Davis,
receives a prize. During her acceptance speech she begins to peel an onion,
as an allegory for uncovering the layers to find the true story. The evening
before, a manager had jumped from the roof of a skyscraper before her very
eyes—and the lens of a cameraman. As an investigative journalist, she had
started to peel back the layers of the man’s life like those of an onion: What
drove him to suicide? A lover, or blackmail or maybe even paedophilia? But
she also “senses” that what people really yearn for is not yet another story
of filth, misery and crime, but a special story, “one which opens our eyes to
the beautiful, to the noble”. The tale of the reluctant hero is just such a
story, and the film depicts how it sinks deeper and deeper into a morass of
egotisms by all those involved in it, including and especially by the acciden-
tal hero himself. But its effect, like the peeling of an onion, is predictable:
people start to cry. The film, itself a mass medium, shows us this as well,
in a last self-critical twist. In this respect, the reporter’s tears can be inter-
preted as tears for us all, for our ineffectual search for truth (the truth of pure
morality). Art—theatre, opera, film—is able to produce emotions, and that
means: to generate them artificially. Since the mid-18th century, theory has
acknowledged that in art nothing is genuine, and certainly not the emotions
it presents, and yet everything appears as if it were genuine.12
III
As the theatre of sensibility, opera and cinema (especially melodramatic cin-
ema) underline the value of sentimental enjoyment in the modern subject.
However, it should not be forgotten that what we call modernity and, cor-
respondingly, subjectivity are not homogenous notions. I believe there are
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at least three distinct layers: the classical, the agonal and the hybrid.13 The
classical layer of modernity denotes the self-substantiating subjectivity; the
agonal layer permits an inner contradiction of this self-justification to emerge
without solution; and the hybrid layer reacts to the other two with creative
combination. Conceiving of modernity stratificatorily means comprehending
it in parallels, overlaps and changing emphases of its layers, through which
subjectivity advances to become the correspondingly changing hero. The self
is the hero of modern philosophy that Hegel encapsulated.
It is also Hegel whom we have to thank for a philosophical theory of
heroism. Tellingly, he presents it in greatest detail within the framework
of his lectures on aesthetics. Just as art—in its function of creating truth
and community—belongs to the past, so heroism, as a manner of acting
and a model of character, also belongs to the past, of the so-called mythical
age. Within modernity, that constitutional-democratic and capitalist age, the
heroic can only surface in two ways: firstly, under the exceptional conditions
of a revolution or war, and secondly, presuming the conditions of everyday
life, within art. Not only do we draw our initial knowledge of heroes from
art, from the ancient epics and tragedies, but art and heroism also display a
structural agreement. Just as the hero embodies something universally valid,
so the artist in his works presents something universally valid. The hero is
the personification of a sociocultural whole, an individual who embodies a
community; the artist is correspondingly the hero of a socio-cultural truth
which manifests itself in his art. Both the hero and the artist permit an
“idea”, a concept of reality, to manifest itself. And yet this is only true for
premodern epochs, particularly for ancient Greece. Here the hero becomes
the “founder of states, so that right and order, law and morals, proceed from
them.“14
We cannot ignore that Hegel is overly convinced by history being “the
progress of the consciousness of freedom” and by the corresponding dialectic
logic of “sublation” (Aufhebung), in which destruction of the old simulta-
neously serves to preserve it—by transforming it and elevating it to a new
level.15 The tragic, and ironic voice of romanticism—which I call the “agonal”
layer of modernity objected to this when Hegel was still alive. And with the
popular art form of the film, the 20th century has also brought forth a genre
which sees an intriguing return of Hegel’s characterizations of premodern,
mythical heroism: the truly US-American genre of the western. Generally
speaking, one can immediately add that the popular art form of film—more
precisely the feature film or motion picture—relies on the figure of the hero
just as the novel did previously. In cinema, at any rate, heroism is still very
much alive.
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IV
And so, vengeance too is still very much alive. The feeling connected with
revenge is a special feeling.16 The emotion attached to vengeance is an “aggres-
sion affect”, like anger, fury and hate, envy and jealousy, wrath and outrage,
and is therefore connected to violence against others in a closer sense, or to
impulses of action in a more loose sense.17 Revenge is a reaction to suffered
(real or imagined) injustices, is therefore an act of retaliation, and one which
is subjective and arbitrary (as opposed to: regulated by law). Aristotle was
early to distinguish between vengeance (timoría) and punishment (kólasis),
but in the mid-17th century, Hobbes was the first to place revenge defini-
tively within the bounds of public authority and general criminal law. In
the early 19th century, this enabled Hegel to state that heroism had become
outmoded. The position of the individual taking the law (of action) into
his own hands was now assumed by the operatives of public power—public
prosecutors, judges, enforcement officers.18
Since their Greek beginnings, literature and art have portrayed vengeance
as a driving motive behind heroic action. It all began with the first docu-
mented Greek poetry and one of the most famous heroes of our culture. The
Iliad starts with the “anger” or “rancour” (ménis) of Achilles, thus honour-
ing this emotion with being at the very onset of our culture; but Achilles
also stands for the frenzied and bloodthirsty emotion of revenge. In order
to avenge the death of his friend and close companion, Patroclus, he stabs
with his own hands twelve of the most noble Trojans and then, during the
funeral games for Patroclus, brutally drags the corpse of Hector by its heels
behind his chariot. In toneless contempt, Christa Wolf’s Cassandra calls
him “Achilles the Brute” (Achill das Vieh). In contrast, Odysseus’ revenge
against his wife’s intrusive suitors is not frenzied, but patient and—literally—
directed. The motive of revenge, if it is to be a comprehensible motive for
action, requires a narration and the dimension of time, because vengeance is
reactive. It reacts to an occurrence which has already taken place and which
is experienced as unjust and humiliating. In the 20th century, this method of
narration has advanced into film, further increasing by the illusion of reality
which film alone is able to lend credibility.
Cinema boasts numerous films about vengeance, including such classics
as Once Upon a Time in the West (1968, Sergio Leone) and The Godfa-
ther (1972, Francis Ford Coppola), blockbusters such as Rambo—First Blood
(1982, Ted Kotcheff), Batman—The Dark Knight (2008, Christopher Nolan)
and V for Vendetta (2005, James MacTeigue), masterpieces such as Unfor-
given (1992, Clint Eastwood) and singular works such as Se7en (1995, David
Fincher) and Memento (2000, Christopher Nolan). The films of Quentin
Tarantino revolve almost obsessively around the theme of revenge. Less well-
known, yet in two different versions, there is Cape Fear, filmed by John
Lee Thompson (1962, with Robert Mitchum), and a second time by Mar-
tin Scorcese (1991, with Robert De Niro). Max, the main character in the
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film, has been in prison for fourteen years for a crime he did not commit—
fourteen long years, or five thousand one hundred and ten days, and all due
to his lawyer, who withheld evidence. Now he is seeking revenge, driving the
lawyer and his family into a corner so successfully that they can only escape
by resorting to violence. Robert de Niro plays this role as an obnoxious mass
of brawn and muscles, whose face emerges from muddy waters like a prehis-
toric rocky landscape. Armed with the insignia of revenge on his body, Max
demonstrates a source of mental support in cases like his. Western culture
provides men like him (and increasingly also women, Kill Bill being one ex-
ample) with appropriate literature, first and foremost the Bible, Shakespeare
and Nietzsche. Vengeance is rampaging around his head so strongly, burst-
ing all other thoughts asunder, that it forces its way out and expresses itself
legibly on his skin. On his back, Max literally has a cross to bear, one he has
had tattooed there. And below it, in bold symmetry, the threatening words:
“Truth” and “Justice”. On his arm is written “Vengeance is mine saith the
Lord”. It is the arm of a supreme law which takes for itself what profane
law has refused.19 If, as Nietzsche says, God is dead, then there is no Last
Judgement, and the individual, so Max concludes, has to perform under his
own steam.20 That is the honour awarded to the master criminal: he poses
a threat to positive law by taking the law into his own hands, and to this
extent can be seen at the same level as the hero. Both are to be admired as
much as they are to be feared.
V
“All emotions believe in a happy ending.“ Above, I suggested that emotions
are eudaimonic; that they signify what can be deemed a successful life. If
“ending” (Ausgang), however, means “exit”, a “door through which to go”, a
“hole to a subterranean passage”, or even a “walk”, “promenade” or “emer-
gence” (just as it can be understood in Kant’s famous definition of Enlighten-
ment as “man’s emergence—Ausgang—from his self-imposed immaturity”),
then the happiness of the emotions would consist in, when not a solution,
then at least a way out, an escape path. Vengeance, for example, instead of
being satisfied, might then be transported into a different emotion. When we
leave the cinema or turn off our DVD players after watching Cape Fear, we
not only enjoy picturing the emotion of vengeance (against people who have
committed—real or imagined—injustices against us), but also, and even more
so, enjoy the aesthetic emotion of having seen a good film, with the cultural
added value that this emotion can principally be generalised, and maybe even
universalised, in a morally acceptable way.
J.Fruchtl@uva.nl
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NOTES
1. “The Ranger in the Silver Forest” (Der
Förster im Silberwald, orig. title Echo der
Berge) is an Austrian-German film from
the year 1954. With about 28 million
visitants, it is one of the most success-
ful films in Germany ever; see wikipedia.
org/wiki/Echo_der_Berge.
2. Hegel 1977, 119.
3. See Josef Früchtl 2009 (German orig.
Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp 2004).
4. “Es fängt mit Verliebtheit an und en-
det mit Scheidung. Es beginnt im Jahr
1933 und endet in Trümmern. Die
großen Opern beginnen vielversprechend
mit gesteigertem Gefühl, und im fünften
Akt zählen wir die Toten.”
5. “Alle Gefühle glauben an einen glücklichen
Ausgang.”
6. Cf. Tugendhat 1979, 200.; Wolf 1984, 156;
and, recently Nussbaum 2013, 11.
7. Cf. Dwyer 1987; on Gracian, taste
and other ‘leading humanist concepts’ cf.
Gadamer 1975, 7.
8. On the Stoics cf. Nussbaum 1994; Nuss-
baum 2001, above all Ch. 1 and 7; on
Hobbes cf. Skinner 1996; on Spinoza cf.
more recently Saar 2013.
9. Cf. Kappelhoff 2004, 11.
10. In the style of Tan 1996. Tan is guided by
psychological research into emotions.
11. Cf. Früchtl 1996, 102.
12. Cf. Diderot’s famous essay “The Para-
dox of the Actor” and the discussion about
aesthetic illusion and aesthetic appearance
in Lacoue-Labarthe 1998, 248-266; Reben-
tisch 2012, 67 & 273.
13. This is what I try to show in detail in my
book on The Impertinent Self, loc.cit.
14. Hegel 1975, 185.—The concept of “found-
ing” (Stiftung) was particularly shaped by
Martin Heidegger. For him it had a three-
fold meaning: a bestowing (which cannot
be forced or deduced from what was there
before—a cultural or logical tradition), an
establishing (a grounding act) and a begin-
ning (with which something—radically—
new begins). Certainly, Stiftung can be
interpreted in at least a conservative and
a revolutionary manner (cf. Kern 2003,
171).
15. Hegel 1970, 32, my transl.
16. From a philosophical point of view, one
can quite rightly doubt whether there will
ever be a general theory of emotions;
whether trying to comprehend emotions
is not like nailing jelly to a wall. Since
Aristotle, philosophy has nevertheless had
much to say about this “object”. As is
widely known, philosophers in their ratio-
nalistic bias have formulated several mis-
givings about the emotions, yet respond
to them with growing interest, especially
since the 1960s. Here we should highlight
Kenny 1963; Solomon 1976; Oksenberg-
Rorty 1980; in German then Fink-Eitel
and Lohmann 1993. Perhaps, philosophy
can really do no more than elicit “fam-
ily resemblances” (Wittgenstein) between
emotions, and legitimate them within their
cultural contexts. But that would already
be a start.
17. Cf. Demmerling and Landweer 2007, 287.
18. Cf. Hegel, Aesthetics, loc.cit, 184; on Aris-
totle and Hobbes cf. Probst 1993, 1 and
3.
19. Albeit in opposition to the theological-
Christian sense. When the Old Testa-
ment speaks of God’s vengeance, it is the
restoration of the whole or the salvation
of a community which is meant. It is not
acceptable to interpret this in the manner
we are accustomed to: that of a hating or
vindictive disposition. In Deut. 32, 35 the
reservation is formulated: “Vengeance is
mine”. Paul takes this on (in Romans 12).
Accordingly the Christian does not, in the
words of E. Käsemann, perform the Last
Judgement (cf. Probst, “Rache”, loc.cit.,
2).
20. Max’s conclusion is not Nietzsche’s. In
his On the Genealogy of Morality, Niet-
zsche introduces the theory that vengeance
is not only an “instinct”, but also a “re-
sentment” which has crystallised, like the
Jewish-Christian religion, out of the posi-
tion of those who are socially weaker. But
ethically his intention is the abolition of
vengeance.
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